M any of the world's environmental problems can only be solved through concerted international efforts. This has led to hundreds of multilateral environmental treaties, which vary widely in their ambition levels and effectiveness 1, 2 .
One key challenge facing such efforts is that any given country's contribution to a collective effort is likely to depend, to varying degrees, on the contributions of other countries [3] [4] [5] . This makes such efforts potentially vulnerable to non-cooperation by others, notably when countries responsible for a large part of a highly salient environmental problem fail to cooperate or disengage from existing cooperation [6] [7] [8] [9] .
Non-cooperation by countries that are important to international environmental problem solving can affect collective efforts in several ways. Most obviously, such non-cooperation usually means that problem solving is incomplete, in the sense that the share of the problem that the non-cooperator is responsible for is not taken care of. Equally important, however, is that non-cooperation by others can also enhance the political leverage of non-green parts of electorates and interest groups in countries whose governments would otherwise want to cooperate, particularly when cooperation is costly and level-playing-field economic arguments can be invoked [10] [11] [12] .
While the pathway to vulnerability of international environmental agreements that involves incomplete problem solving is crucial and well-researched, the second pathway, which operates primarily through public opinion, has received much less attention. Climate change mitigation, on which we focus here, is highly interesting in this respect. The transition from an explicit burden-sharing and formal targets-based approach under the Kyoto Protocol to the pledgeand-review approach under the Paris Agreement comes with less clarity about how firmly key emitters are committed to reducing their emissions. Moreover, the largest historical emitter country, the United States, has explicitly disengaged from the Paris process, while some other important countries are sending mixed signals 13 .
As noted above, one important mechanism through which uncertainty over the problem-solving contribution by large-emitter countries may weaken the political resolve of other countries operates through public opinion. Many studies show that policy choices by governments tend to follow a kind of thermostatic process 14, 15 .
That is, they are associated with prevailing public demand for government action or inaction in a given area 16 , although wellorganized interest groups may at times lead to deviations from prevailing public opinion (median voter policy preferences) [17] [18] [19] , and public opinion may often affect policy choices not directly, but via elite perception of public opinion 20 . In climate policy, where mitigation measures have strong and direct effects on people's everyday lives, public support for such measures is particularly relevant 21 .
To begin with, the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) approach, relative to the previous approach of explicit, legally binding emission targets, may, from the viewpoint of the public in any given country create more uncertainty, a priori, about whether other countries will stick to their pledges. Such uncertainty arises at two levels. First, various studies explaining widespread compliance with international legal commitments point to domestic audience costs as a key factor 22, 23 . They argue that government accountability to citizens implies that when governments accept an international legal commitment and then fail to comply, this is likely to reduce the political support levels from their citizens. Second, noncompliance with international legal commitments usually attracts criticism from other parties to the agreement and may even result in punitive action. The shift to NDCs increases uncertainty about how the domestic public and other countries would respond to non-compliance with less formal commitments that are not a result of explicit international bargaining following a legally binding 'give-and-take' logic.
These two potential sources of uncertainty have not prevented the large majority of countries from engaging in the Paris process and putting forward NDCs. Nevertheless, they could make governments and their publics more 'edgy' with respect to the behaviour of other countries, compared to the Kyoto approach. Following the logic of 'tacit bargaining' 24 , in the absence of a formal international deal including national targets, one should assume that governments and their publics are likely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and adjust their support levels for their own country's emission cuts in response to the actions of other countries. We should therefore expect that the level of public support for climate policy in a given country decreases in response to other countries' failure to cut their
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Success of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is founded on nationally determined contributions (NDCs), hinges on whether domestic support for international environmental agreements would be undermined if countries that are crucial to the global effort fail to reduce their emissions. Here we find that citizens in China (n = 3,000) and the United States (n = 3,007) have strong preferences over the design of international climate agreements and contributions of other countries to the global effort. However, contrary to what standard accounts of international politics would predict, a survey-embedded experiment in which respondents were randomly exposed to different information on other countries' behaviour showed that information on other countries failing to reduce their emissions does not undermine support for how international agreements are designed. While other factors still make large emission cuts challenging, these results suggest that the Paris approach per se is not posing a problem.
emissions, and vice versa, particularly when commitment failure occurs in a large-emitter country.
To assess this possibility, and thus the risk posed by the NDC approach, we examined how public opinion in the world's two largest-emitter countries, China and the United States, is affected by the mitigation behaviour of other countries. Our approach can be regarded as a stress test of the Paris Agreement from a public opinion perspective 25 . To this end, we carried out survey experiments in China (n = 3,000) and the United States (n = 3,007), using quota sampling to ensure representative samples in terms of age, employment status, gender, income and region (see Methods). In a conjoint experiment, participants were asked five times to choose between two randomly assigned policy proposals with differing characteristics among a set of attributes (cost per household, legal strength of the agreement, decision-making process, inclusion of large emitters, number of countries included and compensation to affected areas; see Supplementary Table 1 ). This resulted in a final number of observations (N) of 30,000 and 30,070 for China and the United States, respectively. The attributes tested here are particularly relevant, as they capture citizens' willingness to accept certain cost implications and domestic compensation for policy losers, as well as important international policy design features that could safeguard against free-riding or commitment failure by others. This conjoint experiment was combined with an information-provision experiment, in which respondents were randomly assigned information on coal consumption in other countries in comparison to the home country (see Supplementary Fig. 1 ). Although conjoint experiments have previously been used to examine public support for international climate agreements and unilateral climate policy 26, 27 , this combination of a conjoint experiment with an information-provision experiment, the treatment designs, and the statistical approach used to analyse the data are novel. This study design allows us to estimate the causal effect of information about other countries' behaviour on preferences regarding the design of global climate policy and national effort levels, as well as the causal effect of specific contents of policy proposals on support for climate policies 28 .
To estimate the treatment effects of interest, we use a recently developed Bayesian variable-selection method, LASSOplus, which enables us to simultaneously select and estimate relevant heterogenous treatment effects 29 (see Methods for details).
Public support for climate-agreement design features
The unconditional average marginal component effects (AMCEs, Fig. 1 ) for the Chinese and US samples, which result from the analysis of data from the conjoint experiment, provide a sense of the general patterns of public support for particular features of international climate-agreement design. Notably, the results are broadly similar for both countries and in line with previous research in this area; although most of this research focuses only on the United States and a few other Western countries 26, 27 . International climate agreements become less popular when costs increase, when fewer of the major emitters are included, and when agreements are weaker in terms of legal status and enforcement. They become more popular as the number of participating countries increases, when details of the agreement are decided jointly by countries, and when some form of compensation mechanism is included.
We also observe some substantive differences in the salience of agreement design features when comparing Chinese and US publics. Chinese respondents tend to place more importance on the legal status of the international agreement. US respondents, however, tend to be particularly concerned about China's inclusion in the agreement, with an international agreement including China receiving higher levels of support. US study participants are more sensitive to the cost of an agreement to the individual. Nevertheless, preferences regarding the design of an international climate agreement are broadly similar, suggesting commonalities in what citizens in the different countries consider important features of such an agreement. 
effects of information on choice of climate agreement
Combining the conjoint experiment with the information-provision treatments, which involves a much more complex study design than in previous research, allows us to address whether and to what degree non-cooperation by other countries could undermine public support. Specifically, it reveals whether non-cooperation by other countries induces lower public support for climate policy, and whether it induces changes in the relative saliency of design features of an international climate agreement that reflect reciprocity concerns.
The first four treatment conditions (see Supplementary Fig. 1 ) compare consumption behaviour for a fossil fuel, specifically coal, in the respondent's home country to that in another country: the United States or China, depending on the sample, the United Kingdom, or generic 'other countries' . These information treatments capture the possible combinations of whether a specific country is mentioned, and whether the other country (or countries) increased or decreased fossil fuel consumption. Treatment 5 gives respondents information only on their own country, whereas the control group receives no information about coal consumption in their own country or in other countries. By allowing AMCEs from the conjoint experiment to vary according to which information treatment a study participant receives in the information-provision experiment, we can estimate whether, and to what degree, preferences are dependent on other countries' fossil fuel consumption and thus emissions behaviour. Figure 2 shows how support for the most popular international climate agreement in the control group changes when individuals are given information about the behaviours of their own country and other countries. These results show that information about other countries' increasing emissions can lead to a decline in support for the respective climate agreement, relative to other possible agreements. For example, the probability of acceptance for this climate agreement decreases by 0.12 when study participants are given information about increasing coal consumption in the United Kingdom. However, this impact is not particularly large, as even with this change the probability of acceptance for the agreement remains high, above 0.75.
effects of information on support for agreement features
To further understand our results, Fig. 3 shows how preferences for the specific features of an agreement are affected by information about the behaviour of other countries compared to that of the respondents' respective home country. Generally, we find that respondents from China are remarkably unresponsive to other countries' behaviour, when compared to the US respondents. The only response from the Chinese survey that is sensitive to information on other countries' behaviour is that respondents who receive information about coal consumption in China only are less sensitive to paying an increase of ¥100 rather than ¥50 in their utility bills, than those who also receive information about other countries' behaviour. Therefore, for the remaining discussion of these results we focus on the US sample.
Cost. Increasing or decreasing coal consumption in other countries does not have a consistent impact on responses in the US survey. The only pattern that emerges is that US respondents are less sensitive to cost when emissions in other countries are increasing compared to when they are decreasing. This suggests that inaction by other countries may actually lead to US respondents being more willing to pay for climate action.
Legal strength. We find evidence that when other countries increase their emissions, there is a decrease in support for less legally binding agreements. This is matched by an increase in support for agreements with a formal legal basis, notably in the case of US respondents receiving information about increased coal consumption in China or in the United States only. Supplementary Table 23 .
that involve a joint decision-making process. This effect is also mirrored in the control group.
Inclusion of other countries. US respondents do not wish to exclude countries that have increased their emissions. For example, when given information about China's increased emissions, they are more supportive of including China in the agreement. If anything, US respondents are less likely to demand that 'friendly' countries be a part of the agreement if the information suggests that other countries are also reducing coal consumption. This is shown by the decrease in support for including the European Union (EU) in the agreement when respondents receive information about other countries decreasing coal consumption.
Number of countries.
There is no consistent pattern with respect to this policy attribute. While increased emissions by the United Kingdom lead to a desire for involving more countries, information on emissions behaviour of China and other countries does not induce such a response.
Compensation. The results show that information about a decrease in coal consumption in the United States leads to increased support for compensation measures, independent of information about coal consumption in other countries. This is shown by the control group, which receives no information about coal consumption in the United States or other countries, being markedly less supportive of compensation measures. This suggests that a lack of support for compensation for the coal industry is driven by a belief that the industry has not faced a substantial decline in previous years.
Discussion
We find that both Chinese and US publics have strong preferences regarding the design of international climate policy, in terms of their most-and least-favoured features. Nevertheless, failure of other countries to act does not, per se, reduce the public's appetite for taking action against climate change. This is most evident in China, where the behaviour of other countries has effectively no impact on preferences regarding climate policy design. Whereas we find some effects of information on other countries' behaviour on preferences regarding particular attributes of climate policy design, this does not lead to a substantive decrease in overall support for the most popular international climate policy.
A potential limitation of this study is that the information-provision treatments focus on coal consumption. While this is intended to make the treatments easy to grasp and to avoid false negatives due to respondents' inability to properly understand this information, it may have biased results in favour of non-reciprocal policy preferences. This is because reducing coal consumption, in addition to mitigating global climate change, can also have local public health benefits. In view of research suggesting that there is mass public support for unilateral reductions in fossil fuel consumption generally (not just coal) 9,27,30,31 , we do not believe that focusing on coal has biased these findings. Moreover, our results are broadly similar for China, which faces severe local air pollution problems linked to burning of coal, and the United States, where air pollution levels are much lower. We are therefore confident that our results are not an artefact caused by a focus on coal consumption. However, it would be useful to replicate this study with a focus on fossil fuels and emissions more generally. Further research could also re-assess the audience-cost argument noted above to obtain more nuanced insights into the relevance of international reciprocity in global climate policy. Specifically, it would be interesting to explore whether and how political support of citizens for their respective governments (rather than for climate policy more narrowly), defined in broad terms, changes as they learn that their government complies with or weakens its commitment to its existing NDC in response to other countries weakening their commitment or disengaging from mitigation policy. A further limitation of our study might be that a majority of Chinese respondents did not correctly understand our treatments showing that coal consumption in China increased during the time period covered by the treatment information (see Supplementary  Fig. 3 ). We suspect that this may be a result of the current political situation in China. Another possibility is that respondents may have focused on a small decrease in 2011-2012, rather than the general increase in the overall time frame. Analyses that exclude respondents who failed the respective comprehension checks do not substantially change the results for the Chinese respondents. This, along with the fact that the main focus of our study is on the effect of information about other countries' behaviour, leads us to conclude that this issue does not have a major impact on the inferences we aim to make in this paper. Nevertheless, future research could benefit from more careful consideration of how domestic political situations may impact attempts to measure public opinion.
Our findings build on and add to existing research that has used simpler study designs to investigate public support for unilateral climate policy 9, 27, 30, 31 . They suggest that, at least for the time being, public support for current and future commitments countries have expressed as part of the Paris process is not vulnerable to commitment failures or disengagement by other countries, such as the United States, even though citizens do pay attention to the actions of other countries and prefer that other countries contribute to such efforts. Rather, it seems that citizens' preferences towards the make-up of international climate policy are firm, in the sense that they are stable when faced with information on non-cooperation by other countries. As a result, climate policy has probably become less prone to traditional concerns over reciprocity and, related to these concerns, burden-sharing and free-riding, which are important in other areas of international cooperation such as trade and security. We believe that our findings may be reflective of an emerging global norm-to which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, civil society, and other actors have been contributing-where mitigating climate change is the 'right thing to do' , even when faced with commitment failures by others.
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Methods
Survey procedure and respondents. The survey was fielded with Ipsos online panels in November and December 2016. Fielding the survey directly with Ipsos means that they engaged in a number of quality control steps, for instance excluding speeders or preventing duplicate responders, details of which can be found in ref. 32 .
Ipsos used quota sampling in order to be representative of the general population. For the United States, quotas were based on age, employment status, gender, income and region. Participants from China were recruited online from tier I and II cities and quota sampling was used to ensure representativeness for age, employment status, gender, income and region.
In Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3 , we show that these observable characteristics of individuals are balanced across treatment conditions. See Supplementary Tables  2-22 for regression tables of these estimates. Participants provided demographic information, then received the information treatment followed by a comprehension check, before the conjoint experiment.
Information-provision treatments.
To identify the causal effects of information on other countries' behaviour on preferences over specific climate policy attributes, we combined the conjoint experiment with an experiment in which we randomly assigned participants to one of six information-treatment arms in which information was provided on coal consumption in other countries in comparison to the home country in the past few years (see Supplementary Table 2 for the distribution of treatment assignment in the sample). By using real information, we made these treatments as plausible as possible while still adhering to the nondeception principle. Supplementary Fig. 1 summarizes the treatment conditions T1-T5, in terms of whether a country or set of countries increased or decreased coal consumption. Study participants received such information both in verbal and graphical form (see Supplementary Section 7 ). The first four treatment conditions compare the consumption behaviour of the respondent's home country to that of another country or countries. These information treatments capture the possible combinations of whether a specific country is mentioned or not (T1 and T2 versus T3 and T4), and whether the other country(ies) increased or decreased coal consumption. Treatment 5 gives respondents only their own country's information, whereas the control group receives no information about coal consumption in either their own country or other countries. These treatment conditions and their combinations allow us to assess and compare, on the basis of realistic information, the effect of learning about emissions in one's own country and other countries.
Respondents were asked comprehension-check questions (see Supplementary  Fig. 3 ), depending on the information treatment they received.
Conjoint experiment.
In our conjoint experiment, participants were asked to select between randomly assigned policy proposals whose characteristics differ along a set of attributes: cost to household per year, legal strength of agreement, decision-making process, inclusion of large emitters, number of countries included, and compensation to affected areas. Study participants were shown pairs of proposed international climate agreements, side by side, in which the values of specific policy attributes were manipulated and randomly assigned. Participants then chose their preferred policy. They chose between two randomly generated climate agreements a total of five times. The 3,007 participants in the United States and 3,000 in China thus generated information on their support levels for a total of 30,000 and 30,700 hypothetical climate agreements, respectively (five rounds times two proposals, times the number of study participants).
Supplementary Table 1 displays the policy (climate agreement) attributes and their possible values (expressions), as used in the conjoint experiment. Supplementary Section 1 also displays the text that introduced the conjoint experiment. The climate policy attributes in our experiment reflect features that could change in salience from the viewpoint of citizens, depending on the fossil fuel consumption, and thus emissions behaviour of other countries. These features can be grouped into three broad categories: financing and expenditures; country participation; and the legal nature and strength of the international agreement. To make the experiment as simple and straightforward as possible, which is essential for 'ordinary citizens' being able to understand and process the information they receive, we decided to focus on coal consumption.
For financing and expenditures, we varied the cost individuals would pay in the form of increased utility bills. We also varied whether an agreement includes provisions for (domestic) government expenditures that would be targeted to regions dependent on the coal industry. We expected that citizens would be more sensitive to cost considerations and demand higher financial support if other countries are seen to be failing to reduce emissions. For country participation, we varied the number of countries participating in the agreement, as well as whether specific large-emitter countries were participating. We expected that providing information that other countries have increased their fossil fuel consumption could alter whether individuals think it is necessary to include more countries, which could potentially also be laggards, into the agreement. Finally, we also varied the legal and decision-making features of the agreement. We varied the extent to which the agreement is legally binding and envisages punishment for non-compliance. We also varied the decision-making process, ranging from full autonomy in deciding the level of a carbon (coal) tax to having all countries involved in the decision. Faced with information that other countries have increased fossil fuel consumption, citizens may demand more stringent legal provisions in the agreement and give greater autonomy to their home country in making the decision.
Conjoint designs are analogous to factorial designs. However, full randomization overcomes the practical issue that the number of combinations in a complicated factorial can easily exceed the number of observations 28 . Specifically, it has been shown 28 that within the potential outcomes framework, with full randomisation of the values, the average treatment effect of each value is nonparametrically identified, defined as the AMCE.
Analysis. The traditional way to estimate how the information treatments affect respondents' choice in the conjoint experiment would be to include interaction effects between dummy variables for the attribute values and the treatment conditions. This, however, results in substantial statistical inefficiency, as it introduces a number of strongly collinear variables for which parameters need to be estimated, many of which may have zero effect.
To avoid this issue for identifying the treatment effects, we used a recently developed estimator, LASSOplus 29 . This estimator both selects and estimates the relevant heterogenous effects to estimate, in a way that also accounts for the fact that respondents evaluate multiple conjoint profiles. By simultaneously selecting and estimating the heterogenous effects it avoids the bias that can occur by conducting several separate sub-group analyses, and also provides appropriate measures of uncertainty. To estimate the most popular proposal we reverted to using a logistic regression. The analysis is conducted using R v. Comprehension checks. Results of the comprehension checks are shown in Supplementary Fig. 3 . US respondents performed very well in terms of treatment comprehension. However, we found that Chinese respondents performed poorly when answering the question of whether China increased or decreased emissions in the time period under consideration. Specifically, a majority responded that China did not increase emissions in this time period. However, when examining the information about behaviour of other countries, pass rates were significantly higher. Therefore, for the important part of the treatment, we are confident that most respondents understood the presented information correctly. Nevertheless we re-estimated the statistical models, excluding individuals who failed the comprehension check; the results did not substantively change for either country. Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5 show how the main effects vary, comparing the whole sample (intention-to-treat effects) to the sample that only includes those who passed the comprehension check (exclude failures) for both United States and China. As is clear from Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5 , the preferences towards international agreements remain consistent. Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7 show the estimated heterogeneous effects from this approach and lead to much the same conclusion. While excluding failures leads to two additional effects for those in the China-only information group, we believe that this is not a large-enough change to make us suspect a significant bias in the original results.
Ethics statement. The surveys that generated the data for this study were a part of the ERC Advanced Grant project no. 295456 (Sources of Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance). Ethical approval for the project as a whole was obtained at the beginning of the project (ETH Ethics Committee approval, 28 September 2012, EK-2012-N-41, extended to March 2018). The Ethics Committee of ETH Zürich and the ERC Ethics Monitoring unit regularly monitored the project, with the final survey items provided on a continuous basis. The surveys for this study were fielded by Ipsos, and respondents were first informed about the nature of the study before being asked to consent. The study also followed the no-deception principle, whereby only factual information was provided to respondents.
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Study description
The study uses quantitative (survey) data, with embedded survey experiments.
Research sample
The sample consists of 3000 respondents from China and 3007 from the United States. This is a sample of 18+ individuals collected through online sampling.
Sampling strategy
Respondents are recruited online through the survey firm Ipsos. We used quota sampling to ensure representativeness of the general population. Hard quotas were used on: sex (male/female), income quintile, age, and region. Soft quotas were used on: education and employment status.
Data collection
The surveys were completed online, with respondents blind to the experimental conditions they are a part of. 
Data exclusions
The main analysis does not involve data exclusions. In the Methods section we examine how results change when we exclude respondents who fail a comprehension check.
